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AbStRACt 
Through a comparison of sector cases in Mozambique and Ghana, the paper analyzes why and how 
African states engage in developing productive sectors and with what success. It argues that success-
ful state interventions depend on four factors: (1) sustained political support by the government 
leadership; (2) the existence of an embedded and mediating bureaucracy; (3) changing the ‘rules of 
the game’ which govern the distribution of economic benefits and resources; and (4) the organisa-
tion of industry actors and institutionalised interaction between industry actors and state actors.
The paper starts with a case of successful intervention in Mozambique, using the four factors to 
explain why the Mozambican government’s efforts to rehabilitate the sugar industry were success-
ful over a fifteen year period. The paper then considers experiences in three sectors in Ghana that 
illustrate variation in the four factors and thus different economic outcomes. Specifically, cocoa, 
export is a case of sustained political support, palm oil is a case of poorly implemented industrial 
policy, and horticulture export is a case of political neglect of an industry. In concluding, the paper 
emphasizes the political context in which these sector cases are embedded and which shapes how 
ruling elites make policies and implement them, placing the comparisons within a broader concep-
tual framework.
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1. INtRODuCtION
Why do states intervene in the economy to 
support productive sectors? Furthermore, why 
do states choose particular policies and initia-
tives as the means of intervention, and why do 
some state interventions result in better out-
comes than others? Whitfield and Therkildsen 
(2011) present a conceptual framework for 
answering these questions. The questions are 
framed in terms of why states intervene in order 
to engage with debates about Developmental 
States. It makes little sense, however, to lump 
together different individuals and organiza-
tions into one generalised concept of the state, 
since we need to understand how they interact 
and the logics driving their actions based on 
their position within the government, the bu-
reaucracy, the political party, the military, and 
so on. Even making a conceptual line between 
the government (political leaders) and the state 
bureaucracy (civil servants) can be problemat-
ic. In some countries there are sharp differences 
between state bureaucracy and political leaders, 
while in other countries, such as Mozambique, 
the ruling political elite and the state bureau-
crats overlap due to shifting constellations over 
time as state bureaucrats have become politi-
cians.1 Instead, the framework on which this 
paper draws focuses on incentives facing ruling 
elites, which are generated by the characteris-
tics of their ruling coalitions.2
This paper compares the experiences of 
Mozambique and Ghana using a sector ap-
1 See Macuane (2010) on the state bureaucracy/technoc-
racy and political leadership in general in Mozambique.
2 By ruling elites we mean the political leaders atop the 
incumbent government, and by ruling coalition we mean the 
groups and individuals behind the rise of the ruling elites to 
power and/or those groups and individuals who support 
the ruling elites now that they are in power, typically in 
exchange for benefits.
proach.  Economic outcomes not only vary 
across countries; they also vary within coun-
tries across sectors and specific industries. This 
variation must be explained, and it is argued 
that the economic attributes of particular sec-
tors cannot fully explain the variation. Rather, 
what may be changing at the industry level 
includes what drives ruling elites to support 
specific productive sectors, who are the rel-
evant productive entrepreneurs, and who are 
the relevant state bureaucrats. Thus, relations 
between the ruling elite, business and bureau-
crats can and do vary by industry. By looking 
at several sectors within a single country, we 
avoid both problems of inappropriate uses of 
national averages, because national averages 
hide what is going on in specific sectors and 
thus give an inaccurate picture, and of invalid 
part-to-whole mappings where what is going 
on in one sector is different from than what is 
going on in others, and thus we cannot general-
ize from them about the national level (Snyder 
2001). We use a sector approach to illustrate 
the different political logics at play and show 
how factors come together differently, and 
thus explain economic performance.3 It is still 
important, though, to place industry-specific 
analyses within a broader understanding of the 
characteristics of the ruling coalition and the 
broader dynamics of business-state relations. 
The sector cases discussed in Mozambique and 
Ghana are contextualized within the broader 
political economy dynamics characterizing the 
country.
 Economic development can be and is driven by a few 
dynamic sectors at a time, so a country does not have to 
have a lot of well-performing industries. But what matters 
for the aggregate economic performance of a country is 
the characteristics of the well-performing industries in a 
country at any given time: growth, job creation, upgrading, 
synergies with other industries, possibilities for linkages, 
spillovers of technological capabilities from one industry to 
another.
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What we do in this paper is more of an induc-
tive analysis. We started with the empirical re-
search on specific sectors in Mozambique and 
Ghana, and compared the sector cases with 
each other and with key bodies of existing lit-
erature on business-state relations and the po-
litical economy of building technological capa-
bilities. Through this double comparison, we 
identified four factors critical to good econom-
ic performance: (1) sustained political support; 
(2) an embedded and mediating bureaucracy; 
(3) changing the rules of the game; and (4) or-
ganizing the sector. These factors explain good 
economic outcomes, but why these factors emerge 
must still be explained. Using the conceptual 
framework by Whitfield and Therkildsen 
(2011) helps us to situate these case studies 
within a more general answer to the question 
of why they do or do not emerge. Thus, this 
paper starts with presenting the empirical ma-
terial and arguments about the four factors in 
each sector and country, and concludes with 
linking them to the conceptual framework. In 
the remainder of the Introduction, we briefly 
present the four factors. 
The first factor is sustained political support 
from the ruling elite for developing the indus-
try. Some scholars may refer to this kind of 
sustained political support as ‘political will’, 
but we need to unpack the notion of ‘political 
will’, which is too easily used in political analy-
sis as a residual category: Something does not 
happen because there was no political will, or 
it does happen because there was political will. 
Instead, we need to ask why there was sustained 
support from the ruling elite. In doing so, we 
explore the linkages between characteristics of 
the ruling coalition and the desire and ability 
of the ruling political elites to support specific 
industries, the policies they choose in doing 
so, and how they are implemented (see Whit-
field and Therkildsen 2011). The imperatives 
of building and maintaining ruling coalitions 
as well as winning elections are a critical thread 
linking the characteristics of ruling coalitions 
and the incentives they face in making policy 
decisions and implementing them. 
Sustained political support from the ruling 
elite is the most important of the four factors 
because to a large extent the other three fac-
tors depend on political support being present. 
Without sustained political support, there 
might be a competent state agency with politi-
cal linkages, but bureaucrats’ ability to medi-
ate between the ruling elite and industry ac-
tors will be less effective. Without sustained 
political support, bureaucrats will not have the 
political back-up to change institutions and al-
locations of resources, which negatively effect 
powerful groups in society, and they will not 
be able to effectively liaise with industry asso-
ciations and use ‘carrots or sticks’ to get them 
to organize.
The second factor refers to aspects of state 
organization relevant to the industry, in par-
ticular whether it is characterized by an embed-
ded and mediating bureaucracy. By embedded, 
we mean that the state bureaucrats engaged in 
institutionalized relations with industry actors, 
and such interaction was crucial to meeting 
industry needs and creating credible commit-
ment.4 The importance of embeddedness is 
much discussed in the literature on business-
state relations in developing countries (see 
Maxfield & Schneider 1997). The literature 
argues that embedded bureaucrats have knowl-
edge of the industry and relations with relevant 
industry actors, which enhances their abil-
ity to collect and possess information, moni-
 Capitalists have reason to discount the value of the incen-       
tives and withhold investment, unless government officials 
can make credible long-term commitments (Schneider & 
Maxfield 199: 11). Credible commitment means that capi-
talists believe what state actors say, and then act accord-
ingly. For Peter Evans (199), credible commitment is a key 
aspect of embeddedness.
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tor business behaviour, and articulate a vision 
and viable strategy of how to support particu-
lar industries (Evans 1997). The credibility of 
government’s productive sector policies in the 
eyes of business, and thus business’s willingness 
to undertake risks in conjunction with those 
policies, are undermined when business is out 
of the policy loop (Biddle & Milor 1997: 280). 
Movement of actors in and out of the bureauc-
racy and business can be important in creating 
the networks that embed state officials (Thorup 
& Durand 1997; Schneider 1993). The impor-
tance of movement as one way of embedding 
bureaucrats is evident in the sugar case, as will 
be discussed shortly. Lastly, it should be noted 
that this kind of relations between bureaucrats 
and industry actors can include coercive ele-
ments: sticks as well as carrots.
By mediating, we mean that bureaucrats 
liaised between business and political inter-
ests, technical and technocratic concerns, and 
administrative and legal procedures (see Buur 
et al. forthcoming 2012). The importance of 
mediation is less discussed in the literature, 
but we find it to be very important in some 
of the specific case studies, particularly in the 
sugar case. There can be considerable mistrust 
on the one hand by parts of the bureaucracy 
and the political elite concerning the inten-
tions and effects of allowing foreign investors 
to run an industry, and on the other, the for-
eign investors can have no experience working 
with a de facto one-party state apparatus and 
political system. As we show, the ability of the 
bureaucrats in the National Sugar Institute in 
Mozambique to go-between and bridge differ-
ent interests and expectations of the political 
elite and new industry actors throughout the 
process was crucial to the success of the reha-
bilitation project. 
The third factor that must be considered is 
the extent to which the ‘rules of the game’ have 
been changed, referring to the formal and/or 
informal rules which govern the distribution 
of economic benefits and resources. Because 
changing the rules of the game almost always 
produces resistance from the losers, it requires 
political support to do it. In one of the cases 
we consider here, the state bureaucracy and 
the government renegotiated the rules of the 
game away from sugar traders and in favour of 
national sugar producers and the creation of a 
protected internal market (Buur et al. 2011). 
Generally, African countries operate in mar-
ket conditions where dependency on volatile 
export markets for primary or value-enhanced 
products can be devastating for both investors 
and peasants, with severe implications for the 
legitimacy of the government promoting such 
production. There is therefore often a need for 
securing both access to markets and a certain 
relative predictability of revenues, particularly 
during the initial years of production when 
productivity is lower, ‘sunk costs’ are high, 
and learning and technological upgrading tak-
ing place.5 Furthermore, supporting higher 
growth requires interventions that often in-
clude changes in existing benefits or in the al-
location of state resources (Khan 2000, 2009). 
These types of changes can have detrimental ef-
fects for specific groups. Thus interventions to 
support a particular productive sector can have 
social costs, which can lead to social conflict 
and mobilization against changes. If the ruling 
coalition cannot absorb or tolerate significant 
social costs from the sources that are affected, 
then they will not pursue those interventions 
or abandon such interventions during imple-
mentation. Thus, strong political support from 
the ruling elite is required for negotiating mar-
ket access for a nascent industry and protect-
ing it while it grows. 
 Sunk costs are costs that have been incurred and cannot 
be recovered.
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The fourth factor involves the level of organiza-
tion among industry actors and institutionalized 
interaction between the industry and the state. 
We know that institutionalized interaction be-
tween state and business at industry level is im-
portant for coordination and collective action, 
for states to meet industry needs, for credible 
commitment to materialise, and for monitoring 
and enforcement of conditions related to learn-
ing rents and for incentive structures to be effec-
tive. Institutionalised interactions require strong 
industry associations to interact with ruling 
elites and state bureaucrats, but strong indus-
try organisations often require external pressure 
in order to come about (Doner & Schneider 
2000). Here the role of the state in facilitating 
industry actors to organize themselves and solve 
their own collective action problems, through 
the use of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ is crucial. Fur-
thermore, it can be argued that industries need 
to be organized as a prerequisite for successful 
economic performance (Brautigam et al. 2002; 
Ouma and Whitfield forthcoming 2012).
The paper focuses on a case of successful 
state intervention to support a specific indus-
try: the rehabilitation of the sugar industry in 
Mozambique. It explains why the Mozam-
bican government’s efforts to rehabilitate the 
industry were successful, using the four factors 
presented above. Then the paper briefly con-
siders Ghana’s experience with three produc-
tive sectors (cocoa export, palm oil and horti-
culture export) that illustrate variation in the 
four factors and thus different economic out-
comes. Horticulture export is a case of political 
neglect and unfulfilled potential. Palm oil is a 
case of poorly implemented industrial policy. 
Lastly, cocoa export is a case of sustained polit-
ical support, similar to sugar in Mozambique. 
However, it is important to note differences 
between the sugar and cocoa export industries 
in terms of value-added, technological capa-
bilities of the entrepreneurs and sector-specific 
potential for upgrading – all of which can have 
significant implications for economic transfor-
mation in the respective countries. 
2. thE MOzAMbIquE CASE: StAtE-
DRIvEN REhAbIlItAtION Of thE 
SuGAR INDuStRy
2.1 Overview 
Sugar cane has been produced in Mozambique 
since the end of the 19th century. At independence 
in 1975, six sugar estates and industrial plants were 
in operation. The total sugar production capacity 
was 360,000 tons with a production record reached 
in 1972 of 325,051 tons, of which 60 percent was 
for export. Sugar production was the third biggest 
export sector and the biggest formal labour em-
ployer by the mid-1960s and, the sugar sector had 
the largest private firm in the whole of Mozambique 
(INA 2001; Cardoso 1993). Before independence, 
sugar production had begun to decline due to the 
rapidly intensifying independence war in northern 
and central Mozambique that left investors feeling 
insecure and led to ‘disinvestment strategies’ (Cas-
tel-Branco 2002: 83). Furthermore, up to and after 
independence, the flight of capital and skilled la-
bour of all types added to the decline, just as global 
market prices made the sector less profitable. As the 
destabilisation war turned into a civil war through 
the 1980s, production fell and, as a result, the im-
port of sugar increased. 
From the mid-1990s, the Mozambican sugar 
sector underwent a steady process of rehabilitating 
four out of the six sugar estates/factories which by 
that time the government de facto owned.6 The reha-
 Ownership after independence and particularly after the 
Third Frelimo Congress in 19, when a Marxist-Leninist 
one-party state was pursued, is complex. Some sugar com-
panies became nationalized, others only intervened in by 
the state, meaning that there was no legal transfer of the 
assets implying that former owners could try to reclaim the 
assets after 1990 when the new liberal multi-party constitu-
tion was approved.
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bilitation process involved partial privatisation and 
large-scale foreign direct investments in both cane 
production and sugar processing and refining ca-
pacities. The sugar strategy Politica e Estratégias para 
o Desenvolvimento do Sector Açucareiro, approved by 
the Council of Ministers in 1996, focused on issues 
related to privatisation, ownership structure, attract-
ing experienced investors, cost efficiency, human 
capital development, market creation, the financial 
viability of rehabilitation, and the potential impact 
of the sector for the social and economic rehabilita-
tion of the rural areas (see INA 1996). The over-
all objective of the sugar strategy was to: “Produce 
sugar in order to satisfy the domestic market and 
the preferential quotas for export in a manner that 
is economically and socially efficient and sustainable 
thereby in the long run contributing to a better food 
security and sustainable economic growth” (INA 
1996: 2). Four out of the six sugar estates were tar-
geted for rehabilitation. Three regional sugar play-
ers with productive and marketing capabilities were 
brought in: the two biggest South African sugar 
companies at the time (Tongaat-Hulett and Illovo 
Sugar) and a Mauritian consortium of four com-
panies (FUEL Group, ENL/Savannah, Compagnie 
d’Investissement et de Développement Ltée and 
Kalua Properties Ltd. and Stam Investment Ltd.)7
Tongaat-Hulett Ltd. bought into the Xina-
vana and Mafambisse industrial plants and 
estates, situated in the south and central 
regions, after 1996. 
Illovo Sugar Ltd. together with the Petiz 
Family, the original Portuguese owner who 
 The privatization process was not a single event but 
rather occurred over several years where at least one of 
the investing companies first was hired on a management 
contract with the Mozambican state so the future investor 
could “learn to work in Mozambique with the Frelimo re-
gime” (Interview Director of sugar company March 2011) 
and the state could see that the company had the man-
agement capacity and could deliver on what was expected 
(Interview former Finance minister (2010).  
•
•
had regained control over the estate after 
the privatisation process was opened up, 
took over the Maragra estate and industrial 
plant, situated in the south, in 1998. 
The Mauritian consortium took over the 
Marromeo estate and industrial plant in 
the central-northern region after the new 
Millennium, but sold its 50 percent share 
in 2007 to the French company Tereos, the 
world’s fourth largest sugar producer. 
The Mozambican state, through Banco de Mo-
zambique, retained after privatisation at least 51 
percent of the shares in the companies, except 
for the Maragra estate/plant. The state retained 
a majority stake in order to lend money for the 
rehabilitation on behalf of the sugar companies 
and for the state to monitor the rehabilitation 
process though representation on the admin-
istrative boards. As loans were paid off and/or 
new investments were made by the companies, 
the state’s shares slowly diminished. However, 
even today, the state still has shares in at least 
two of the companies.8 
The formal target was to bring in private in-
vestors with long-term experience and cutting-
edge expertise in sugar production and mar-
keting, with solid backup from research (see 
INA  1996; FAO 2000: 5). This would, it was 
reasoned in the sugar strategy, rectify all the 
fault-lines from the political experiments of the 
1970s and 1980s. Foreign direct investment 
was not, therefore, in the first instance about 
bringing in finance, but rather concerned with 
bringing in productive capabilities. Finance for 
the first wave of rehabilitation was primarily se-
cured through government-guaranteed loans, 
where the government took “cheap loans” at 
various multilateral and commercial credit 
 See Buur et al. (2011) on why the government maintained 
an ownership share.
•
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facilities (such as development banks, special 
funds and facilities providing such loans pri-
marily to countries). The exception was Illovo, 
where the investors decided to finance the re-
habilitation by themselves out of fear of state 
intervention and because they wanted to test 
their capacity to work outside South Africa. 
This said, over time, all the companies made 
their own substantial investments. 
The use of government-guaranteed loans 
had been anticipated by the sugar strategy, 
which also defined key state and government 
tasks related to the creation and enforcement 
of a protected internal market, provision of 
certain forms of infrastructure like electricity 
from Cahora Bassa, as well as rail and port up-
grading. The strategy also anticipated that the 
role of the state should be carried out by the re-
structured National Sugar Institute, which was 
to move from its past role of running (down) 
the industry to a more facilitating role, and 
eventually just a monitoring one. 
Since the rehabilitation began, the area 
under cultivation rose from 7,266 hectares in 
1998 to 35,000 hectares in 2009, and sugar 
production increased to just over 200,000 tons 
of sugar by 2003. By 2003 sugar exports exceed-
ed local consumption, with total export figures 
reaching 134,796 tons in 2008, even though 
the industry-owned Distribuidora Nacional de 
Açúcar (DNA) had managed to double nation-
al consumption and distribute Mozambican 
sugar all over the country. Around 32,000 jobs 
(permanent and temporary jobs) were created 
at the four rehabilitated sugar estates (CEPA-
GRI 2009, 2010). The industry also led to jobs 
in outsourced service functions in land prepa-
ration, planting, maintenance and transport as 
well as independent producers and down- and 
upstream jobs created along the value chain. 
The sugar industry is once again the biggest 
formal non-state employer in Mozambique. 
These are jobs in rural areas where those taking 
up employment are a mix of local populations, 
rural migrant workers and expatriates. Salary 
scales in the industry are generally well above 
what can be earned in rurally based agriculture 
industries. 
Social services such as health, education 
and housing are to a large degree catered for 
or strongly subsidised by all four factories. Ac-
cess to social and financial services around the 
four rehabilitated estates and plants are well 
above what one normally encounters in rural 
areas (Locke 2009). The industry is “creating 
an income multiplier effect, with sugar work-
ers having money to spend on other goods and 
services [and] the sector also creates the oppor-
tunities for other industries to develop, sup-
plying goods and services to the sugar mills” 
(LMC 2006: 7; see also INA 2005, Capítulo 
7). Furthermore, the EU’s 6 million Accompa-
nying Measures Fund mitigating the effects of 
changing the European sugar regime led to an 
increase in the outsourcing of cane production. 
Whereas only 0.4 percent of cane was pro-
duced by independent Mozambican producers 
in 2005, this figure increased to 4 percent by 
2008 with around 15 associations involving 
1,365 producers. The EU Fund also signals 
the first direct involvement of donor money 
as part of the rehabilitation process, which in 
itself is remarkable considering the levels of aid 
dependence experienced by Mozambique over 
the past two decades.
How do we explain these outcomes? What 
are the crucial conditions for successful state 
intervention to rehabilitate the sugar indus-
try, which saw sustained support among the 
Frelimo government and state bureaucracy? 
We will here highlight four factors that can be 
used comparatively to explain the sector out-
comes. The first factor is sustained political sup-
port from the Frelimo ruling elite. The second 
is the state organization and to what extent it 
was characterized by an embedded and/or medi-
ating bureaucracy. The third involved changing 
the rules of the game: the formal and/or infor-
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mal rules which govern the distribution of eco-
nomic benefits and resources. The fourth fac-
tor involved organizing the industry referring to 
the institutionalized interaction between the 
industry and the state. 
2.2 Sustained support from the ruling 
political elite
The Frelimo ruling elite coalition not only 
provided support for rehabilitating the sugar 
industry, but also sustained support over 15 
years. An undertaking such as rehabilitating 
an industry cannot be done quickly; it requires 
well-thought-out strategies, trial and error, 
time for production processes and learning 
to take place, and building new institutional 
capacities and institutionalized engagement 
between the state and the industry. Sustained 
support over a long period of time was crucial. 
This support involved significant investments 
and allocation of resources, allowing for the 
creation of an internal protected market that 
subsidized the industry while it got on its feet. 
Lastly, it was support that went against the im-
mediate interests of different economic groups 
in society financing key parts of the ruling 
Frelimo coalition, as well as the key financiers 
of the government budget such as the World 
Bank, creating resistance that had to be dif-
fused or countered.
One of the most striking features of the or-
ganization of power in Mozambique is that it 
is the same party, and more or less the same 
group of top Frelimo party leaders, that has 
been in charge since independence. They have 
largely been able to stick together through the 
ideological shifts of the mid-1980s and the 
multiparty dispensation of the 1990s and into 
the first part of the new millennium despite 
substantial differences and conflicts and ten-
sions within the Frelimo ruling coalition. It is 
a ruling coalition that is still organized in and 
around the Frelimo party after surviving three 
leadership changes in the ruling party: Samo-
ra Machel, Joaquim Chissano and Armando 
Guebuza. 
Sustained support to the sugar industry 
was possible because the same ruling elite were 
in power. However, this point has to be nu-
anced by looking at dynamics among factions 
within the higher levels of the ruling Frelimo 
coalition. It was not just the same ruling elites, 
but the same faction among the ruling elites 
under the Presidency of Joaquim Chissano 
from 1986 to 2004, spanning the introduction 
of multiparty democracy in 1994. Tensions 
between different factions within the Frelimo 
ruling elite are important. Later sections of the 
paper highlight these tensions and how they 
were overcome so that the outcome was sus-
tained support for sugar rehabilitation during 
the Chissano period. 
When Chissano took over, he inherited an 
authoritarian party coalition at war and was 
initially vulnerable because lower levels of the 
coalition became increasingly frustrated be-
cause their expectations could not be fulfilled. 
Frelimo’s control over the population and ter-
ritory had since independence been rather 
fragile, except for the less populous southern 
and extreme northern provinces, from where 
most of the Frelimo leadership emerged and 
where Frelimo’s post-independence policies 
had the greatest resonance. At independence, 
the party was not entrenched in a majority of 
provinces, particularly the populous northern 
provinces of Zambezia and Nampula (which 
combined account for half the population), 
while the central provinces of Manica and 
Sofala had only scantily been affected by the 
independence war. Thus after independence 
the rural hinterlands were something to con-
quer for Frelimo, and this often became, if not 
directly a violent process then at least quite a 
forceful course of action (see Mosca 2011) that 
gradually escalated as the destabilisation war 
turned into a civil war during the 1980s and 
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Renamo took control over up to 80 percent of 
the national territory. In general, the civil war 
with Renamo turned increasingly into territo-
rial and population contests where both parties 
tried to conquer as much territory and reign in 
as much of the population as possible before 
the peace accord in 1992. But the government 
was also vulnerable because Frelimo de facto 
governed a limited part of the country with 
an economy that partly had become a barter 
economy and with a state apparatus without 
capacity to implement political decisions. 
The constitutional change in 1990 insti-
tutionalised a shift from a one-party state to 
a multiparty democracy, and the 1992 Gen-
eral Peace Accord that ended the civil war also 
to some extent rewrote the rules for engage-
ment, since elections every five years could 
formally change the government. The Chissa-
no administration used negotiations leading 
up to the transition to multiparty democracy 
to secure a deal that favoured the Frelimo re-
gime and gave the party an advantage before 
the multiparty elections in 1994, so it could 
maintain control over the state apparatus and, 
through it, the economy. It secured a form 
of “winner takes all” political system where 
power was centralized. For example, the pres-
ident had the power to appoint governors of 
provinces. As a result, Frelimo could exclude 
the opposition party Renamo from taking up 
political positions after the 1994 elections, 
despite it winning the elections in a major-
ity of provinces but loosing the overall elec-
tions. Constitutionally, Chissano who won 
the presidential election had the authority to 
decide if any of Renamo´s political leaders 
should be appointed as province governors, 
district administrators and so on. In the first 
national elections in 1994, as well as the 1999 
elections, Frelimo lost heavily to Renamo in a 
majority of provinces, particularly the north-
ern ones and the central provinces of Tete and 
Sofala. 
The key constituencies aligned to the ruling 
Frelimo party coalition changed over time 
from peasants/workers after independence to 
state functionaries, and later, after the reforms 
of the 1980s, expanded to include emerging 
business groups in communication, tourism, 
minerals, energy and trading. The business 
groups aligned to the ruling party became an 
important constituency in the ruling coali-
tion and in return benefited from privatization 
and access to state contracts. The lower level 
factions of the ruling coalition were not very 
strong, and hence had little influence in the 
coalition except in the run-up to elections, as 
they were needed in the tight electoral con-
tests with Renamo in the 1990s. Privatization 
and other government policies were used as a 
means to both maintain a strong state pres-
ence in the economy (see Pitcher 2002) and 
to accumulate private wealth by members of 
the Frelimo ruling elite. Out of these processes 
an embryonic business group is emerging that 
form a key constituency of the ruling coalition. 
However, the rehabilitation of the sugar indus-
try had another political purpose. 
Frelimo needed to do something to increase 
its political support in rural areas, and particu-
larly in Renamo strongholds. The rehabilita-
tion of the sugar industry was a means through 
which the Frelimo ruling elite under Chissano 
sought to link up with populations and terri-
tory in former Renamo areas in the central and 
northern provinces and to provide jobs for key 
southern constituencies after 1994. All of the 
rehabilitated sugar estates/plants were situated 
in areas that, by the end of the 1980s, were 
either controlled or strongly influenced by the 
opposition forces of Renamo or where Frelimo 
needed to realign itself to key constituencies. 
In some of these areas, Frelimo lost the 1994 
and 1999 and 2004 elections. By creating job 
opportunities and supporting the extension or 
directly providing services like health, educa-
tion and electricity and by rebuilding destroyed 
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infrastructure and communication networks, 
the sugar industry allowed the Frelimo govern-
ment to provide jobs and income opportunities 
for demobilised soldiers and slowly to assert its 
control and reorganise and forge new relation-
ships with formerly ‘hostile’ populations. This 
strategy was successful: By 2008 and 2009 Fre-
limo won both local and national elections in 
former Renamo areas like Marromeo along the 
Zambezi River. 
Long before the General Peace Accord in 
1992, the Chissano administration singled out 
territorial and population control aspects as key 
factors, for two reasons: (1) winning over the 
large central and northern populations would 
be crucial for the legitimacy and survival of the 
Frelimo regime dominating the political or-
ganisation of power in Mozambique, and (2) 
the untapped natural resource endowment in 
energy, minerals and oil were all situated in Re-
namo-controlled areas. As part of preparing for 
the end of the civil war, a specialised agricul-
tural ‘task force’ was constituted by high-level 
members of government ministries and state 
institutions and tasked with identifying poten-
tial agro-industries that could provide income 
opportunities and crucial export revenues. 
Equally important was the sector’s capacity to 
provide a certain degree of service provision, so 
the heavy influx of people to the cities could be 
stopped, and demobilised soldiers would see a 
future in the rural areas, as well as presenting 
the Frelimo government in a more benevolent 
manner than many rural populations had hith-
erto experienced. 
The sugar sector was identified as a core 
strategic industry based on post-independ-
ence policies that referred to the potential of 
the sugar industry, due to its superior track 
record as an export commodity, as well as its 
capacity to industrialize and ‘urbanize’ the 
rural areas where ‘monetizing rural economies’ 
changed labour relations. This concern for pro-
viding superior, quasi-urban social services in 
housing, education, health and water, besides 
changing rural labour relations from barter to-
wards exchange based on money, had a par-
ticular historical and ideological background. 
After independence and the Third Frelimo 
Congress in 1977, when Mozambique for-
mally became a one-party state, the economic 
and social policies tried to create a new type of 
modern person – the “New Man” who should 
run the “New Society” with a “People’s Econo-
my” (Buur 2010). The transformative capacity 
of the industry had ideological underpinnings 
related to modernization of the rural areas, 
which, after the end of the civil war in 1992, 
would take place through and with capitalist 
relations. As both socialism and capitalism are 
based on a concept of modernization, switch-
ing from socialism to capitalism in order to 
achieve modernization was not as hard as it 
would first seem. The fact that the rehabilita-
tion of the sugar industry could tap into such a 
long-term ideological project of Frelimo meant 
that members of the ruling coalition who were 
strongly against the turn to a mixed capitalist 
economy could still find reason for not out-
right rejecting and directly working against the 
rehabilitation project. 
The intense focus on social service provi-
sion and infrastructure within the sugar re-
habilitation process engendered support from 
the electorate. The creation of employment 
opportunities for lower level factions of the 
Frelimo party worked to maintain the Fre-
limo ruling coalition and expand its political 
support among the electorate. Whereas the 
sugar estates/plants did not become profit-
able until after 2008, there were immediate 
benefits from the rehabilitation in terms of 
job creation, service provision and infrastruc-
ture development. It is, therefore, not totally 
wrong to argue that this was a strategy to 
build political support that had a long time 
horizon, and it took almost a decade to bear 
fruit election-wise.
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The key question that arises is why did the 
Frelimo ruling elite (or a significant portion of 
the factions that comprise it) chose to mobilize 
political legitimacy, and thus political support 
at election time, through developing an agro-
processing industry, rather than broadening 
its political support through ‘side payments to 
popular sectors’? The Frelimo ruling elite faced 
significant internal threats (concluding a civil 
war and facing limited political support with 
large parts of the population that disliked it) 
and they lacked resources with which to make 
easy side payments, constraining them in their 
options but pressuring them to do something.
2.3 An embedded and mediating 
bureaucracy 
Sustained political support during the Chis-
sano period also included support for the state 
bureaucrats in the National Sugar Institute in 
terms of resources as well as political back-up, 
which were prerequisites for the state bureau-
crats to play their mediating and embedded 
roles. The origins of the mediating and em-
bedded bureaucracy in the sugar case are to 
be found in the fact that many of the state 
and industry actors had worked in relation 
to the sugar industry in private, bureaucratic 
and political positions (in different constella-
tions) since the 1970s. It is a phenomenon en-
countered in some countries that have been a 
one-party state and are now a dominant-party 
state. In Mozambique, the political elite and 
bureaucrats in one way or another – by default, 
incapacity or structural constraints (but often 
all of them at the same time) – have ended 
up running (down) productive enterprises in 
the past while also gaining valuable trial-and-
error lessons that could be used in the future. 
In important ways, this experience created the 
possibility for some parts of the bureaucracy 
to operate as a “mediating institution”, as state 
bureaucrats understood both Frelimo’s and the 
sugar industry’s needs, perspectives and expec-
tations, while still operating with a keen eye 
for the pragmatics of the art of government 
(see Buur et al. forthcoming 2012). 
The sugar sector had for the first ten years a 
functional National Sugar Institute where the 
director had worked in the sugar industry as a 
lower level functionary during the colonial era. 
After independence he continued in the sector 
and was director for one of the sugar estates 
and industrial plants during the first attempts 
to rehabilitate at the end of the 1980s and 
early part of the 1990s. Notably, the person in 
charge of writing the 1996 sugar rehabilitation 
strategy had also worked in the industry since 
independence before becoming director of the 
National Sugar Industry in the mid-1980s dur-
ing the last phase of the state-run era. After re-
habilitation began, he became a state-appoint-
ed representative on various administrative 
boards before ending up as general director of 
the biggest South African investor in the sugar 
industry in Mozambique, Tongaat-Hulett. The 
present director of the Sugar Production As-
sociation was a politically appointed director 
(party oversight of a state-run industry) of one 
of the sugar companies in Sofala during the 
1980s, and during the 1990s he was advisor to 
the governor in Sofala when the decision was 
taken on which estates would be rehabilitated. 
In the same manner, the present provincial di-
rector for agriculture is a former employee at 
three sugar estates where he worked during the 
1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, before inde-
pendence his education was paid for by one of 
the sugar companies where his father worked 
as an office clerk. All the rehabilitated sugar 
companies have either employed or continue 
to employ former top state bureaucrats tak-
ing up key positions in company agricultural 
units, small- and medium-scale cane produc-
tion units or human resources. 
During the height of implementing the 
surcharge, when a tough stand on contraband 
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sugar imports had to be implemented, the then 
finance minister, Luisa Diogo, set up a special 
Task Force comprising representatives from the 
industry, upstream users of sugar, custom author-
ities, police and military, besides representatives 
from all implicated ministries that met monthly 
and tasks were delegated. She personally chaired 
the meetings and the Director for the National 
Sugar Institute functioned as the acting secretary, 
making sure decisions were followed up upon. 
Most of the people involved would have expe-
riences from being part of running an industry 
at one level, being part of political bodies within 
the party during the state intervention years or 
working as a state bureaucrat which allowed for 
considerable knowledge about how to get politi-
cally sensitive, bureaucratically complicated and 
highly legal issues through the political system 
without compromising the industrial needs and 
requirements to such an extent that it would have 
brought the industry to a standstill. 
The sustainability of the relationships be-
tween state, government and the sugar industry 
– be they driven by the priorities of the foreign 
investors, political priorities or bureaucratic con-
siderations – were ensured by being ‘embedded’ 
in these different ways. The industry’s needs and 
functions were combined with social and political 
imperatives (whether deliberately or by default), 
which reduced social and political uncertainties 
enough to reassure those investing in the sector 
and also allowed diverse political imperatives to 
be catered for so that support could be negotiated 
when needed.9 
9 Under Guebuza, support to the sugar industry has waned, 
partly because all the key players from the state and govern-
ment by then had left the sector or had been redeployed 
elsewhere, and partly because of changes in the institutional 
setup where the National Institute for Sugar was trans-
formed into a Center for the Promotion of Agricultural 
Investments, which slowly undermined capacity and long-
standing relationships between the different interest groups 
and the state’s capacity to fulfil its monitoring mandate.  
2.4 Negotiating market access and 
renegotiating the rules of the game 
The sugar sector is known for highly volatile 
markets where the free world market price can 
often be lower than production costs due to 
overproduction and price speculation. For the 
same reason, all the top sugar producers in the 
world protect their sugar industries through 
different forms of tariff regimes. The global 
sugar industry is generally based on produc-
tion for home markets, where some countries 
like Brazil have diversified the home market 
early on with, for example, conversion to etha-
nol so either sugar or ethanol can be favoured, 
depending on world market prices for sugar, 
ethanol and oil. In Mozambique a protected 
internal market was necessary in order to create 
a favourable milieu that could stimulate new 
investments that promoted efficient produc-
tion to mitigate the effects of the world mar-
ket, which was volatile and based on dumping 
prices. Furthermore the internal market was 
necessary while negotiations with preferential 
markets were ongoing. When rehabilitation of 
the sugar industry began, there were no sub-
stantial and favourable trade agreements in 
place that gave access to preferential markets. 
A smaller preferential trade arrangement with 
the US – amounting to 1.3 percent of total 
US imports – allowed Mozambique to export 
between 14,000 and 26,000 tons during the 
1990s, stimulating a small increase in produc-
tion for a period (INA 2001: 4). In the 2000s, 
developments around the European market 
and mechanisms such as the Economic Part-
nership Agreement and Everything but Arms 
Agreement created favourable conditions that 
allowed unlimited access to the European mar-
ket.10 Ironically, this happened exactly when 
world market prices skyrocketed and honour-
10 For the history, see Goodison (200).
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ing the agreement with the EU was less favour-
able than selling unilaterally through the free 
market. But, as history had shown, relying on 
the free market would sooner or later become 
an industry killer, which made the Mozam-
bican sugar industry cautious about burning 
any bridges to preferential markets. 
Establishing a protected market for sugar 
had implications for the distribution of ben-
efits and resources in several ways. First, it 
challenged trade monopolies and the informal 
(contraband) sugar trade in order to create the 
space for an internal formal sugar market based 
on Mozambican sugar production. From the 
outset of the rehabilitation of the sector ini-
tiated in 1997, a ‘price policy’ with a flexible 
levy (surcharge) on sugar imports that catered 
for the creation and protection of an internal 
market had been anticipated. Its implementa-
tion had to wait until the new millennium be-
cause there was not enough sugar produced in 
Mozambique to protect. 
By the time sufficient sugar became avail-
able and the national marketing mechanism 
needed to be implemented, it had become an 
important political issue and created substan-
tial public discussion, with the industry press-
ing for its implementation, and different Freli-
mo and government factions either supporting 
or resisting it. Particularly, top members of the 
party who were involved in transporting formal 
and informal or legal and contraband sugar, 
and party members in economic partnerships 
with powerful importer groups tried in various 
ways to undermine the implementation and 
enforcement of the pricing policy. The party 
factions in favour were primarily top party, 
government and state bureaucrats who were in 
charge of bringing in the foreign investments 
and who were in charge of the custom reform 
and the sugar strategy, as well as the power-
ful factions that for ideological reasons were in 
favour of a national industry but uncomfort-
able with foreign direct investment (they re-
luctantly supported it, but were important for 
winning the internal battle in the party). 
The surcharge became the litmus test for 
state and government commitment to the sec-
tor. It involved a number of ministries and 
regional coordination of harbour and border 
control entities, leading eventually to a major 
overhaul of customs and immigration struc-
tures and affecting investment policies already 
in effect, as well as curbing Indian family trade 
houses, which earned well on the informal 
sugar trade. Challenging trade monopolies, 
which often spanned several continents and 
had strong economic holding power and in-
ternal cohesion (besides paying generously for 
protection to the Frelimo party and individu-
als) required considerable political support for 
the national sugar industry and continual and 
skilful liaison, both within the governing party 
and with external actors. 
Moving from imported sugar to nationally 
produced sugar also had implications for the 
upstream industries, primarily in the beverage 
sector. The beverage sector had been the site of 
considerable investments by big multinational 
companies as well as members of the newly 
created Mozambican economic elite, which 
became an important constituency of Frelimo 
after the first and second waves of privatisation 
during the 1980s and 1990s. The shift from im-
port sugar to national sugar increased the price 
for refined sugar considerably, up to two or 
three times after the surcharge was implement-
ed. Some beverage industry actors speculated 
in dumping price setting (for example Coca-
Cola), and protected the need for importation 
by requiring a certain refinement level for the 
sugar used in soft drink production, which was 
not available at that time in Mozambique, or if 
it was available it was produced up-country in 
Sofala making its use around the downstream 
companies in Maputo excessively costly. In the 
end, a compromise was struck where upstream 
industries bought sugar from the sugar indus-
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try at a favourable price that was considerably 
lower than the reference price used for defining 
the surcharge, and white sugar was provided 
for the now considerable local beverage indus-
try, including fruit juice, beer and soft drinks 
after a ‘tollgate refining’ where brown sugar 
was exchanged for white sugar from South Af-
rica and the price difference was paid by the 
Mozambican sugar industry (see CEPAGRI 
2009; Interviews DNA 2009, 2010). 
Lastly, the steep price increase mentioned 
above was also passed direct to urban consum-
ers and, over time as the industry managed to 
set up and expand its national marketing and 
distributional network, to the rest of the coun-
try. This happened during Chissano’s last elect-
ed period from 1999 up to the local elections 
in 2003 and national elections in 2004. While 
the surcharge measurement underwent adjust-
ments after the first period of implementation 
and was downsized in 2003 for raw sugar and 
2004 for refined sugar (LMC 2004:5), this was 
“relatively fair”, according to FDI industry ac-
tors, as it did not undermine industry needs 
for paying back loans and generating funds for 
new investments (Interview Executive Direc-
tor sugar estate 2008). 
The Chissano-run dominant Frelimo ruling 
coalition carried through the sugar policy despite 
being close to losing the 1999 general elections 
and its unpopularity among Frelimo key urban 
voters. This was possible probably only because 
changing the distributional rules did not benefit 
any particular individuals or groups in the ruling 
coalition. There are no indications that any from 
the top leadership benefited directly or indirectly 
from rehabilitating the sugar sector. Instead, sup-
porting the sugar sector allowed the state and 
government to fashion new links to rural electoral 
constituencies in areas where it had struggled to 
assert itself before. It also allowed the government 
to raise its credit rating, because the foreign com-
panies running the sugar estates paid back their 
state-guaranteed loans. 
2.5 Organizing the industry 
The original sugar rehabilitation strategy antic-
ipated the need for institutional organisation. 
It aimed to ensure that “the different sector 
interests – government (economy), industri-
alists (producers and users) and agricultural-
ists (cane producers) coordinated their indus-
try interests and managed conflicts emerging 
from different interests” (INA 1996: 14). But 
there was no institutional organisation of the 
industry when the rehabilitation of the sugar 
industry was initiated besides the National 
Sugar Institute, which during the one-party 
years after 1977 catered for the needs of the 
both the state and the industry. Organizations 
were established when the need for organised 
encounters emerged, and when they were no 
longer needed they tended to disappear. The 
institutional organisation of the industry is by 
implication intimately related to the creation 
and protection of an internal market. In the 
concrete programme for the creation of the in-
ternal market it was suggested that each com-
pany could market and sell sugar individually 
within a “domestic quota system”, as the sector 
became liberalised and when production lev-
els allowed for it. For exporting, it proposed 
defining one single export agency for nation-
al sugar in order to reduce transaction costs, 
which could be a sugar-producing association 
or a commercial company contracted by the as-
sociation after a public tender. Along the same 
lines it was further suggested that “a division of 
revenues provided by the preferential quotas, 
between the sugar companies in relation to an-
nual production” should be implemented that 
also included “non-preferential export by each 
sugar company” so they got “remuneration 
proportional to exports channelled through 
the export agency” (INA 1996: 77). 
The first organisation to emerge was the 
Associaçao dos Produtores de Açúcar de Mozam-
bique, the national sugar-producing organisa-
tion also known as APAMO. It emerged after 
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1998 first taking care of the sugar producers’ 
interests during the first phase of the reha-
bilitation process, but it has the potential to 
become the organisational centre for future 
investments in cane-based bio-fuel as well. 
APAMO is the organisational centre for the 
tripartite minimum salary negotiations and the 
organization that acts as a mediator between 
the state and industry when necessary. The sec-
ond important institutional access point for 
state-industry relations was the emergence of 
the industry-owned National Sugar Distribu-
tor (DNA), which was created for marketing 
all sugar internally as well as externally, which 
hugely cut down transactions costs11. 
The Frelimo government pressured sugar 
producers to organise themselves in branch 
organisations, or what we positively could call 
‘rent sharing organisations’, as key government 
officials were tired of having to attend to each 
investors particular concerns and needs, many 
of which had consequences for other actors. 
The enforcement was done through cutting 
communication until an organisation was cre-
ated with the mandate to speak on behalf of 
the industry regarding sugar marketing and 
distribution. Intra-industry collective action 
crystallised around the sharing of rents that 
the rehabilitation of the industry and creation 
of the protected internal market created: a) do-
11 The industry tried at first to run the National Sugar Dis-
tributor (DNA) with each of the four companies nominat-
ing a person. But later on a public tender gave the managing 
contract to an internationally recognised company with a 
solid managerial track record, capacity to mediate between 
different business interests and the state, as well as inter-
national networks spanning Europe, Asia, Latin America 
and USA, bringing substantial organisational, marketing, and 
business knowledge to the sector. Much suggests that the 
role of DNA will change as the ownership structure of the 
four rehabilitated estates and sugar plants change and they 
become part of even larger corporations with their own 
corporate strategies for marketing, access to markets, dis-
tribution networks and so forth.
mestic rents generated by the protected market 
pricing policy (both revenues and taxes); b) 
international rents generated from first prefer-
ential export quotas to US and later on export 
access to the European and other markets as 
they became available; and c) rents created by 
preferential treatment of upstream industries, 
primarily in the beverage sector. Here a special 
pact evolved with a sharing deal between pro-
ducers and the state that by and large elimi-
nated, or at least limited, the shares/rents usu-
ally claimed by, for example, domestic traders 
and/or the international free market industries 
characterised by dumping prices and industries 
speculating in such dumping prices. The sugar 
industry managed to develop mechanisms of 
coordinating marketing strategies that allowed 
the different companies to take advantage of 
international “preferential quotas and avoid 
having to dump sugar into world markets” 
(Castel-Branco 2002: 179). 
In reality the union for sugar workers, SIN-
TIA, became reorganised and strengthened 
(making it after a few years the largest affiliate 
under the national federation) right from the 
outset of the rehabilitation process as part of 
trying to manage labour conflicts and disputes 
during the privatization phase. SINTIA be-
came an important union, as the president also 
became president for the national federation. 
Another organisations that emerged in order 
to take care of collective action problems was 
an upstream organisation for industries de-
pending on sugar – the Organisation for Sugar 
Using Industries – comprising both multina-
tional and national beverage producers. The 
organisation was active particularly during 
the creation and enforcement of the internal 
market, where the organisation participated in 
the Task Force and in negotiations around the 
surcharge, but as demands were catered for it 
vanished. The same happened to a consumer 
organisation, which was also created during 
the implementation of the surcharge when 
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prices for ordinary urban residents rose sharp-
ly. It also seems to have disappeared from the 
picture since, as the price setting stabilised.  
Through the organisational engagement, 
institutions are created which have a certain 
durability. As a director for a sugar company 
phrased it “Systems are resilient. They don’t 
depend on one person or the order of a min-
ister” (Interview 2008 Maragra). But impor-
tantly, the organisational features of the in-
dustry evolve as needs, demands, and policy 
requirements produce new situations. As such 
it forms part of creating predictability, as the 
combined effects allow the government and 
subsequent governments to commit scarce re-
sources to the development of the sector, de-
spite resistance from other sectors of society 
and donor groups like the World Bank and 
IMF. Organising the industry also means that 
institutional assurance can be given in contrast 
to personalised assurance to shore up commit-
ment by different political groups even within 
the same ruling coalition. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Is sugar unique due to the particular charac-
teristics of the global economy and consolida-
tion and vertical integration of multinational 
sugar companies? Is the sugar industry unique 
in Mozambique in the sense that the four fac-
tors discussed above do not exist in any other 
productive sector? The sugar sector in Mozam-
bique is generally considered by commodity 
and value chain analysis an exceptional case, 
due to the fact that it is a vertical integrated 
sector involving regionally and internationally 
powerful sugar companies with considerable 
holding power (management and technologi-
cal capacity, access to finance etc.). However, 
when the rehabilitation began between 1994 
and 1996, the situation in Mozambique was 
risky and not conducive to foreign sugar in-
vestment. The infrastructure was in ruins and 
all services monopolised, making transport 
costs three times higher than elsewhere in the 
region. The industry was confronted with se-
vere human resource gaps caused by war, ne-
glect and policy failures. Even though at least 
two of the three initial investment groups from 
South Africa came from solid companies, they 
still needed the state bureaucracy and the gov-
ernment on their side for accessing cheap loans 
through state guarantees (Buur et al. 2011). 
We will suggest that the four factors identi-
fied above can explain the varying degrees of 
success in other formerly strategic sectors that 
the Frelimo government attempted to rehabili-
tate, including cotton, cashew and fisheries. 
They also created either job opportunities for 
former state and party employees or income 
through cash crop participation (for example 
cashew, cotton and tobacco) and supported 
the extension of social services like health, ed-
ucation, and electricity, in addition to techni-
cal extension and rebuilding infrastructure and 
communication networks. It was through the 
productive sectors, usually based on foreign in-
vestments though in some cases (like cashew 
and cotton) with national participation, that 
the Frelimo government tried to assert its con-
trol and increase political support. By doing 
this through foreign direct investment or con-
cessions, the Frelimo government could largely 
control accumulation streams in opposition 
areas, ensuring that independent accumula-
tion would not support the opposition party 
Renamo.  None of the investments in former 
strategic sectors, including sugar, created any 
structural changes to the economy, but they 
did allow the ruling coalition to reproduce it-
self as the legitimate government. 
The cashew industry illustrates how the four 
factors are important and play out differently. 
The Frelimo government’s initially ambivalent 
relationship to the cashew sector should be 
seen in the context of Frelimo’s control over ac-
cumulation. After the sector was privatised, it 
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was pressured by the World Bank to liberalise 
its export market for raw nuts, undermining 
the vast and quite uncontrolled industry in key 
opposition strongholds. On the one hand this 
was problematic as it led to the retrenchment 
of urban workers, but on the other hand it al-
lowed the Frelimo government to over time to 
get relative control over accumulation patterns 
while securing access for some members of the 
ruling coalition to enter the lucrative export 
regime. 
Before privatisation and liberalisation dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s, the cashew industry 
benefited from export restriction of raw nuts in 
order to protect and secure sufficient volumes 
of raw nuts for the industry. By the end of the 
civil war the cashew sector was debilitated and 
clearly needed state assistance and protection. 
Export tariffs were considerably lowered, mak-
ing it more profitable to export raw cashew to 
India, and some new exporters affiliated to the 
Frelimo party were licensed in addition to the 
Asian family-based trade-houses, making huge 
profits in this realm (see Pitcher 2002). The 
local industry nonetheless totally collapsed, but 
as many exporters also had stakes in the indus-
try, the losers were largely industrial workers 
and a few people who had bought themselves 
into the sector during the privatisation pro- 
cess but then had been trapped by the chang-
ing export regime. 
When attempts, by national industry players 
and the USAid-funded American NGO Tech-
noServe, were made after the new millennium 
to restructure the industry and bring in new 
technology and management skills, there was a 
need to renegotiate the export tariffs with the 
mainly Asian family-based trade houses and 
the new members of the ruling coalition that 
got export licenses. Such negotiations involved, 
among others, then President Chissano, who 
personally met with the biggest Asian trader 
in the sector and persuaded him to accept 
changes over time, and a new cashew industry 
is now slowly but steadily emerging. The own-
ers of the emerging industry include some of 
the Asian-based trader-families also involved 
in the export of cashew, as well as newcomers 
and people affiliated to the Frelimo party who 
during the privatisation phase bought them-
selves into the industry . With new affordable 
technology and access to assistance and raw 
cashew nuts former unused industrial plants 
have become resurrected, sometimes in joint 
ventures with investors, in other cases based on 
own access to finance. 
It is with regard to these changing rules 
that the biggest difference between sugar and 
cashew emerges. Both sectors were singled out 
as long-term strategic sectors, but cashew re-
ceived concrete political support much later 
than sugar. While changing the rules of the 
game was necessary for both sectors, for cashew 
 it required a redistribution of resources be-
tween groups forming part of the ruling elite 
coalition, whereas there were no individuals or 
groups in the ruling coalition that benefited 
directly or indirectly from rehabilitating the 
sugar sector. 
An important characteristic of all sectors 
that have had some recent success in Mozam-
bique is that many of the state and sector leaders 
have worked in different constellations within 
the sector in positions within the private sec-
tor and within the state since the 1970s. There 
is therefore a group of people with experience 
and knowledge about both the industry and 
the bureaucracy, as well as good political net-
works to liaise between business and political 
interests.  The organisational model for cashew 
differed nonetheless from the sugar model. The 
US-based NGO TechnoServe, which to some 
extent drove the process of technological up-
grade of the cashew sector, contracted key sector 
personnel, hiring the person in charge of pro-
ducing the sector plan in the National Cashew 
Institute. This person had long-term experience 
during both the post-independent period and 
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after liberalisation and privatisation. Despite 
the existence of a formally independent Nation-
al Cashew Institute, it was considered necessary 
to push for changes in the sector (including how 
raw cashew was distributed between exporters 
and industry groups) by a person liberated from 
the shackles of being a state employee. This was 
considered necessary because being within a 
state institution governed by the ruling Frelimo 
coalition while at the same time having to nego-
tiate changes to the rules of the game with top 
members of the ruling coalition was not consid-
ered viable due to political pressure. 
3. GhANA COMPARISON12
3.1 Characteristics of the ruling 
coalitions in Ghana
Compared to Mozambique, Ghana has a very 
different distribution of power within society 
and thus different characteristics of the ruling 
12 This section is based on empirical research carried out 
in during the period 2009 through July 2010. The research 
focused on the palm oil and horticulture export industries, 
recent and past government initiatives targeting these two 
industries, and Ghanaian national politics in general. The 
data is derived from extensive interviews with industry 
actors, politicians, bureaucrats and donor agency staff rel-
evant for these two industries. The material on the cocoa 
export industry is based on government and consultancy 
documents as well as academic working papers, but has 
also benefited from discussions with Abdul-Gafaru Abdu-
lai (whose ongoing doctoral research includes the cocoa 
export sector). For more information on the horticulture 
export industry, see Whitfield (2010b; forthcoming 2012) as 
well as a forthcoming DIIS working paper by Whitfield on 
the politics of policymaking regarding the industry. On the 
palm oil industry, see the forthcoming DIIS working paper 
by Fold and Whitfield comparing the Malaysia and Ghana oil 
palm industry. On the general politics, see the forthcoming 
DIIS working paper by Whitfield on the characteristics of 
ruling coalitions in contemporary Ghana and the general 
economic implications. These forthcoming DIIS working pa-
pers include documentation of empirical sources and grey 
literature as well as more background information with ref-
erences to the limited published material on these topics.
coalition and its stability. In the contempo-
rary period (1980s to the present), and dur-
ing the same period when the Chissano-led 
Frelimo ruling coalition was in power in Mo-
zambique, Ghana had three different ruling 
coalitions: the Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC) under the leadership of J.J. 
Rawlings; after the introduction of multiparty 
elections, the National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) government under the Presidency of 
Rawlings; and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
government under the Presidency of J.A. Ku-
fuor. By the beginning of 2009, it had yet an-
other ruling coalition: the J.A .Mills-led NDC 
government. The Ghanaian political landscape 
became characterized by two strong political 
factions organized around the NDC and NPP 
political parties. Thus, there has been little sta-
bility of the ruling elite in power, even across 
the PNDC and NDC periods.13 Ghana also 
does not have the same stability in particular 
state-owned or ‘intervened-in’ industrial sec-
tors (created since the 1960s), largely because 
parastatal managers were replaced with each 
change of regime – and there were many! But 
it must be recognized that Ghana and Mozam-
bique had different economic legacies from 
colonialism, with the Portuguese leaving a his-
torical experience with manufacturing (includ-
ing agro-processing) that the British in Ghana 
did not. 
Ghana’s bipolar political coalition forma-
tion is the result of path dependence in elite 
1 There was great instability in the composition of the 
PNDC elite, and most of the key political elite who spear-
headed economic reforms under the PNDC did not remain 
in the NDC by the late 1990s. The PNDC did include many 
technocrats who had been in government under earlier re-
gimes and brought that experience to bear on the general 
economic restructuring under structural adjustment pro-
grammes, but their experience centred on macroeconomic 
reforms and largely account for Ghana’s success in that area 
in the 190s.
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formation and the mythologies surrounding 
two political traditions on which the two po-
litical parties are based. However, the ruling 
elite within these two coalitions are not very 
cohesive. There are strong forces driving elites 
to be aligned with one party or the other, but 
no strong centripetal forces within the parties. 
Fragmentation within the higher levels of the 
ruling coalition results in weak internal disci-
pline among the ruling elite and little control 
over elite accumulation strategies or rent seek-
ing, as long as some of it goes to the party cof-
fers.
The lower level factions of the ruling coa-
lition (whether NDC or NPP) are strong. 
Party delegates are in charge of selecting par-
liamentary and presidential candidates, and it 
is not uncommon for incumbent ministers to 
loose their party primary. The constituency-
level party activists, referred to as party ‘foot 
soldiers’, are critical to delivering votes at elec-
tion time, and thus also wield influence within 
the ruling coalition and pressure on the ruling 
elites for redistributive policies which benefit 
them. These features of the internal structure 
of ruling coalitions shape the ruling elites’ 
policy decisions and constrain their ability to 
enforce discipline within their coalitions. 
Another key constituency of the ruling 
coalition (whether NDC or NPP) are busi-
nessmen aligned to the political parties. Much 
of the domestically-owned business sector in 
Ghana is aligned with the NDC or NPP and 
expect to benefit when their party is in power. 
This alignment is the result of historical lega-
cies (NPP is the party of the merchant class) 
as well as trends in the contemporary period 
where much of the domestic formal private 
sector consists of  businesses that depend on 
state contracts or access to state-provided re-
sources (such as low-interest loans). As a re-
sult, business-state relations in contemporary 
Ghana have been unstable. They changed de-
pending on which party controlled the state. 
Increasing vulnerability of ruling coalitions to 
losing power at the next election resulted in 
two tendencies. First, the ruling elite focused 
on extracting as many rents through political 
office as possible. Sometimes this involved cre-
ating their own businesses to take advantage 
of opportunities created by state regulation 
or intervention, but often in areas that were 
not directly productive. Second, businesses at-
tached to the ruling coalition have short time 
horizons, with entrepreneurs focused on sec-
tors with quick, certain returns to investment 
(again, often not in productive sectors).
In addition to the structure of the ruling 
coalitions, the competitiveness of elections in 
Ghana has a significant impact on the actions 
of ruling elites. In Ghana under the Fourth 
Republic, the NDC and NPP became increas-
ingly competitive after several electoral cycles. 
This situation led to a strengthening of the 
lower level factions, but also to the increasing 
importance of ‘floating voters’, who are not 
party loyalists and may change their vote with 
each election. Loyal voters of each party are 
not enough to win elections, so political par-
ties must capture swing votes. Electoral con-
tests are about winning swing voters, and so 
the ruling elite pursue ‘election-driven’ initia-
tives which are defined by the characteristics 
they have in common: the initiatives cover a 
large geographic area; produce immediate, vis-
ible results; and are implemented in ways where 
the government can claim credit directly.
In sum, the structure of the NDC and 
NPP political coalitions are similar, and thus 
they illustrate similar tendencies in office. 
Key constituencies of the ruling coalitions 
are higher level factions of the political elite, 
lower level party executives and activists, and 
aligned businesses, but the ruling elite are 
also influenced by wooing swing voters in the 
electorate. The four year term in office means 
that there is not much time to recoup politi-
cal investments and reward loyal party mem-
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bers, and coalitions are vulnerable to losing the 
next election. 
Access to state resources is crucial to hold-
ing both the NDC and NPP political coali-
tions together. There are no large sources of 
finance outside of the state that political fac-
tions can easily tap into, such as finding big 
capitalists as clients. One might wonder then 
why the very competitive elections in Ghana 
do not spin out of control into violence. This 
is because the Electoral Commission in Ghana 
is independent and strong, the political elite 
have agreed to share power in this way, and 
the constituencies of the ruling coalitions cut 
across ethnic cleavages (Whitfield 2009). Gha-
naian history has left an impression among the 
political elite that other means of rotating the 
elite factions in power (i.e. through military 
coup) leads to economic decline. Having said 
that, the very close electoral contests in Ghana 
lead to legal and illegal political accumulation 
by the ruling elite to fund election campaigns 
as well as to public spending aimed at loyal and 
swing voters. In turn, these processes create 
macroeconomic instability and thus serious, 
negative effects on the economic transforma-
tion process. For example, Ghana’s economic 
crisis at the end of 2008 was not caused by 
global financial markets, but was largely of its 
own creation (see Whitfield 2010a).
The government’s budget is dependent on 
foreign aid direct transfers (money that goes 
through the state), but the ruling elite are also 
dependent on foreign aid administered outside 
the state in order to provide social services and 
goods. The state used to be heavily dependent 
on export taxes from the cocoa sector, but this 
dependence declined in the 2000s as VAT tax 
became more important. Another important 
source of tax revenue is customs tax, especial-
ly since Ghana serves as a gateway for many 
countries around it. Thus, it is not surprising 
that the state agencies responsible for govern-
ing sectors important for financing the state, 
such as the Cocoa Board, the Internal Rev-
enue Service and Customs Service, and the 
Ports and Harbours Authority, are very effec-
tive state agencies. It is also not surprising that 
the ruling elite sign off on many donor-funded 
projects just for the resources without caring 
too much about the content of the project or 
about supporting the state bureaucrats who 
negotiate with donors over the content.
The remainder of this section presents a 
brief, stylized summary of three productive 
sectors in Ghana that are characterized by dif-
ferent levels of support from the ruling elite, 
which corresponds with differing levels of suc-
cess in either developing new industries or ex-
panding and upgrading old ones. These sectors 
are cocoa export, oil palm and horticulture ex-
port. In each sector, we briefly explain the rea-
son for political support (or neglect) and the 
degree of success of state actions targeting the 
sector, by looking at the four factors identified 
in the successful Mozambican sugar case. 
3.2 Cocoa export: this is Ghana’s 
‘sugar’
Cocoa export in Ghana strongly resembles the 
sugar case in Mozambique on all of the four 
factors, which, we argue, explains its relative 
success in Ghana. Of crucial importance is the 
sustained support that the cocoa sector has 
received since the 1980s – support sustained 
across all three ruling coalitions. When the 
PNDC government had to revive the econo-
my in the early 1980s, the ruling elite chose 
cocoa as the centre of its economic recovery 
strategy because of the cocoa sector’s history 
as the pillar of the colonial and post-colonial 
economy. Cocoa dominated exports (over 50 
percent of export revenue), was the main for-
eign exchange earner, was a key source of state 
finance because a significant portion of cocoa 
revenue stayed with the state through export 
taxes, and was a key source of income in rural 
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areas in the southern part of the country. Over 
time other sources of government revenue in-
creased (and cocoa taxes decreased), but cocoa 
continued to be a key source of income in the 
rural south (produced in almost all southern 
regions) and a key driver of poverty reduc-
tion over the 1990s and 2000s (see Whitfield 
2010a). Thus, all ruling coalitions have used it 
to generate political support, and would not 
risk doing anything seen to undermine this 
‘holy cow’. In this sense, cocoa was to Ghana’s 
ruling coalitions what sugar was to Frelimo.
The different ruling coalitions’ political 
support for cocoa is evident in the ability of 
ruling elites to negotiate hard with the World 
Bank and IMF on cocoa sector reforms over 
the course of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, and 
to largely succeed in getting their way: to only 
partially liberalize internal and external mar-
keting and partially privatize the state buying 
company. Ghana is the only cocoa-producing 
country in the world that has maintained a 
heavy state presence in the cocoa sector, while 
all other West African countries completely 
dismantled their cocoa marketing boards under 
Bank and Fund pressure. There is a consensus 
across the NDC and NPP that full liberaliza-
tion is not desired. Through the Cocoa Board, 
the Ghanaian state plays an important role in 
assuring bean quality, which secures Ghanaian 
beans a premium on the international market. 
International buying companies supported the 
governments and the Cocoa Board in fighting 
off Bank and Fund pressure for full liberaliza-
tion of the sector. 
Cocoa is the main (successful) example of 
the Ghanaian government developing a pro-
ductive sector as a means to increase political 
support. In terms of exports, it is the only suc-
cess. Cocoa constitutes at least one third of ex-
ports. Gold exports constitute another third, 
but have marginal benefits for the population 
and in the building of technological capabili-
ties, because mining capabilities have limited 
spillovers to other sectors. There is no other 
large export sector, nor is there another pro-
ductive sector that affects incomes significant-
ly.14 Horticulture and palm oil were the largest 
non-traditional exports in 2007, but together 
they only accounted for about 4 percent of 
total non-traditional exports.
On the second factor of an embedded and 
mediating bureaucracy, the cocoa sector scores 
quite high. The sector has its own state agency, 
the Cocoa Board, which is under the authority 
of the Ministry of Finance and not the Ministry 
of Agriculture (indicating its importance).15 The 
Cocoa Board has generally been empowered by 
the ruling elite to play a key role in negotiations 
over cocoa sector reforms and in running the sec-
tor. Cocoa Board technocrats have a lot of expe-
rience and expertise, even though they may have 
presided over running down the cocoa sector in 
early decades (as was also the case in sugar in Mo-
zambique). Reforms of the Cocoa Board across 
the 1980s and 1990s acted to strengthen the or-
ganization, making it more efficient and more ca-
pable. The Cocoa Board is no longer dependent 
on government resources for buying cocoa, but 
rather raises finance through international syndi-
cated loans. However, the government allocates 
money from the national budget to the Cocoa 
Board for other programmes administrated by the 
Board such as increasing productivity and pro-
viding social benefits. Cocoa Board bureaucrats 
have institutionalized interactions with cocoa 
farmers and the licensed buying agents, especially 
through the Producer Price Review Committee 
that sets the producer price for cocoa. There are 
1 In 200, there were an estimated 20,000 cocoa farmers 
with an average productive cocoa area per household of 
about  acres (or 2 hectares).  
1 The Cocoa Board consists of several arms: Quality Con-
trol Division, Cocoa Marketing Company (under which is the 
Produce Buying Company), Cocoa Services Division, Cocoa 
Research Institute, and Cocoa Processing Company..
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weaknesses in the Cocoa Board’s performance, 
though, especially in increasing the productivity 
of smallholders, partly because the specific cocoa 
extension service was hived off to the Ministry of 
Agriculture (as part of a concession to the World 
Bank in negotiations) and functions poorly.
Regarding the third factor, the Cocoa Board 
is in charge of negotiating access to export mar-
kets. Its de facto monopoly on export marketing 
means that it can enforce quality standards as well 
as export large volumes and thus have significant 
leverage with international buyers. The Cocoa 
Board controls the rules of the game, which are 
in favour of cocoa bean exports. It is not a case 
of an import-substitution good, so importers are 
not relevant. A few cocoa-processing factories 
emerged in the 2000s, but the Cocoa Board al-
lows only a limited amount of beans to be proc-
essed, so the rules of the game are in favour of ex-
porting beans and rather than in moving up the 
value chain. However, the extent of opportunities 
in domestic processing in the cocoa value chain 
has been questioned (Fold 2002).
Regarding the fourth factor, the cocoa indus-
try is very organized. The heavy presence of the 
state in organizing the sector was necessary due 
the fact that production was (and still is) domi-
nated by a very large number of smallholders. 
The Cocoa Board organizes quality check and 
assurance to international buyers, export market-
ing, support to farmers in increasing productiv-
ity, and secures finance for the sector. The Board 
used to organize collection and internal market-
ing until that was liberalized in early 1990s, and 
the state buying agent remained the dominant 
internal buyer until very recently, but was partial-
ly privatized through listing on the Ghana stock 
exchange in 2000. 
However, a key difference between sugar in 
Mozambique and cocoa in Ghana concerns the 
economic implications of the two sectors. Sugar 
is a processed good, and as with the manufac-
turing sector, it has more positive effects on 
the economy: It involves developing domestic 
manufacturing capabilities (managerial, techni-
cal, artisan) that can spill over to other sectors, 
more linkages with the economy (upstream and 
downstream), creates more jobs, and higher mul-
tiplier effect within communities. The sugar es-
tates also provide social services. The cocoa sector 
has less economic effects. Cocoa production is 
still characterized by low-technology cultivation, 
very small farms and a high use of family labour. 
There is limited value-addition, and limited link-
ages between the cocoa sector and other sectors 
of the economy. 
Another difference is that the sugar industry is 
largely driven by foreign investors and the state, 
whereas the cocoa industry is largely driven by 
smallholder farmers, licensed buying agents (for 
collecting and selling to the state, which include 
foreign and Ghanaian companies), and the state 
(in charge of export marketing and finance). But 
they share two common features: (1) the absence 
of a domestic capitalist class driving production, 
and (2) the ability of the ruling elite to monitor 
the accumulation process within the sector. The 
two are probably connected, and flag an impor-
tant issue within the politics of building produc-
tive sectors in African countries.
3.3 Palm oil: a rather unsuccessful 
industrial policy initiative
The palm oil industry shares many structural 
similarities to sugar in Mozambique, but also 
important differences. Palm oil is a processed 
good with many possibilities in moving up the 
value chain and in linkages with other indus-
tries.16 The Ghanaian palm oil industry con-
sists of four oil palm estates with processing 
1 The fruit of oil palm trees are processed into a crude 
palm oil by extracting oil from the nuts, which can then 
be refined into various types of oil products that can be 
used as an input into many types of edible and non-edible 
manufactured goods.
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mills, which were previously either state-owned 
or were joint ventures between the state and 
foreign investors and which were privatized in 
the 1990s and early 2000s. However, unlike 
the Frelimo government, the ruling coalitions 
in Ghana did not have a strategy for the palm 
oil industry when they privatized the estates; 
rather the focus seems to have been on getting 
the most money out of privatization, and there 
was no significant government support to re-
habilitate and expand the industry. The new 
foreign owners were expected to bring new in-
vestments and were left to do their thing. 
One reason why the Ghanaian governments 
may not have wanted to support the newly 
privatized palm oil estates has to do with the 
structure of the industry, which is fragmented 
into two sub-sectors. The modern sector, which 
produces oil for industrial purposes, consists 
of the four large estates/mills that were priva-
tized and a handful of medium and small mills 
owned by Ghanaians. The traditional sector, 
which produces oil for the domestic market 
(because crude palm oil is used in cooking), 
consists of a large number of informal pro- 
cessors, who use very basic technology or even 
do it manually, and many smallholder farmers. 
The smallholder farmers straddle both sectors, 
as the estates only produce about 50 percent 
of their raw supply and have to buy the rest 
from smallholders, including formal contracts 
with outgrowers. Ghanaian governments in 
the 1960s and 1970s that created the large es-
tates ran into many problems with expropriat-
ing land and with smallholders who were to 
be outgrowers for the estates. In the contem-
porary period, smallholders see the foreign-
owned estates as exploitative. Thus, the ruling 
elite would probably not want to be seen as 
supporting the foreign-owned estates, and as 
not supporting smallholders. The sugar in-
dustry in Mozambique does not have this for-
mal/informal or industrial use/consumption 
divide; there was not a history of smallholder 
production of sugar and the sugar estates have 
only just started to implement smallholder 
outgrower schemes.
In short, the palm oil industry in Ghana 
was largely ignored under the PNDC and 
NDC, apart from improving the efficiency of 
the large state-owned estates in the lead up to 
privatization. This neglect of the industry was 
seemingly reversed when President Kufuor of 
the NPP government included oil palm pro-
duction as one of his President’s Special Initia-
tives (PSI) announced in 2001, which aimed 
to develop new pillars in the economy. The Oil 
Palm PSI aimed to support smallholders to 
increased oil palm production and link them 
with newly created mills, in which they would 
have ownership. 
The Oil Palm PSI focused on the smallhold-
er producers of oil palm fruit bunches, and did 
not take into account the needs of the existing 
estates/mills (foreign and Ghanaian-owned) or 
the linkages between the existing estates/mills 
and smallholders. These existing modern pro-
cessors had no influence over the design of the 
initiative. Rather, the design was driven by two 
people. One of these people, a ruling elite who 
was the architect behind the PSIs, was close to 
President Kufuor and became in 2003  Minis-
ter of Trade and Industry and made a close bid 
for the NPP presidential nomination for the 
2008 national elections. The other person was 
the politically-appointed bureaucrat in charge 
of implementing the Oil Palm PSI based in the 
new PSI Secretariat, who had a background in 
the Ghana palm oil industry. These two people 
converged on the desire not to work through 
and with the existing estates in order to expand 
the industry, but to create something new and 
separate and which was driven by the state. 
However, they diverged on the specific models. 
The bureaucrat wanted to learn from the Ma-
laysian example of large-scale state investment 
in and management of plantations comprised 
of land worked by smallholders, while the rul-
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ing elite person wanted a more modest scheme 
with more private investment and manage-
ment but still with the state as the leader.
Getting state resources to fund the Oil Palm 
PSI (for either model) was difficult because the 
PSIs in general did not have the united sup-
port of the NPP ruling elite, despite being 
closely connected with the President, and the 
President was unable to create that support. 
The PSIs came to be seen as the project of the 
individual ruling elite leading them, who was 
seen as President Kufuor’s choice as his succes-
sor as early as in 2003. As a result, the PSIs be-
came caught up in the power struggle among 
the NPP ruling elite over control of the party 
and selection of the next presidential candidate 
after Kufuor stepped down.17 This internal 
party struggle translated into a struggle over 
financing for the PSIs in general, and the Oil 
Palm PSI in particular. Kufuor lacked control 
over the party and the ability to make different 
factions within the ruling elite tow his line; he 
spent a lot of time and resources rewarding and 
punishing the ruling elite by moving them in 
and out of positions. He also had a lot of other 
demands on a limited amount of resources, 
demands seen as equally pressing in maintain-
ing the ruling coalition and winning elections, 
as well as averting short-term economic crises. 
In short, the PSIs were not adequately funded. 
Even the minimal budget allocations from the 
Ministry of Finance were often delayed or not 
forthcoming. Domestic banks invested some 
money. And the ruling elite person leading the 
initiative would not seek Parliamentary ap-
proval for the PSI Secretariat to take foreign 
1 Note that this internal struggle for the 200 national 
elections started before the 200 national elections in 
which Kufuor was nominated unopposed as the party’s 
presidential candidate. In Ghana, the President can only 
serve two terms.  
loans, presumably afraid of his ability to garner 
the necessary political support.
Regarding factor two, there was no mediat-
ing and embedded bureaucracy. The PSI Secre-
tariat, a new state agency, was created in order 
to implement the PSIs and placed under the 
Office of the President. However, the location 
of the PSIs was moved several times within the 
bureaucracy. The PSI Secretariat bureaucrats 
were competent and loyal to the NPP, but they 
suffered from the NPP internal power strug-
gles, which denied it adequate resources to im-
plement the initiative – even the more modest 
model envisioned by the individual ruling elite 
leading the PSIs. Yet, even when the financ-
ing from the government was not forthcom-
ing, the PSI bureaucrats did not change their 
approach. Notably, at the same time, an exist-
ing large estate/mill was negotiating a project 
with the Ministry of Agriculture and a donor 
agency that combined donor financing and 
the technical and managerial skills of an exist-
ing estate to organize and support smallholder 
farmers in an outgrower scheme. Nor did the 
bureaucrats attempt to create an environment 
and use incentives to allow existing estates to 
expand, with or without smallholder schemes. 
Of course, the lack of change in the bureau-
crats’ approach could have been caused by the 
lack of support from the ruling elites. In late 
2006, bureaucrats leading all the PSI initiatives 
were replaced, undermining continuity in im-
plementation and revealing conflicts between 
the bureaucrats and ruling elites.
The PSIs were created just after the 2000 
national elections which the NPP just barely 
won. Despite the real economic objectives be-
hind the Oil Palm PSI, it quickly became po-
liticized. The individual ruling elite wanted to 
claim credit for the benefits of the PSI, as part 
of his larger political ambitions. Other NPP 
politicians wanted to use the PSI to deliver 
something to their constituency, with their eye 
towards the next elections. And still other NPP 
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politicians and party leaders wanted to take 
advantage of the economic opportunities that 
the PSI offered. These factors affected exactly 
how the initiative was implemented, but did 
not necessarily lead to negative economic out-
comes. In fact, one of the most positive out-
comes of the Oil Palm PSI is major investment 
in a new processing mill by Ghanaians within 
the higher level of the NPP ruling coalition. 
It is difficult to say that participation by NPP 
politicians and party leaders was the downfall 
of the initiative. Rather, it was the inability of 
the individual ruling elite leading the PSIs to 
secure financing (and thus to secure support 
across the NPP ruling elite), to shield the Oil 
Palm PSI from being used by other politicians 
to meet redistributive demands  in their elec-
toral constituencies, and to adequately support 
the entrepreneurs (NPP or not) who took up 
the economic opportunities.
 On the industry’s side, its association was 
weak and basically defunct. After privatiza-
tion, with the exit of the state’s role, the in-
dustry faced severe collective action problems. 
The only thing the association does is set the 
price of domestic palm oil. Palm oil is an im-
port-substitution good, in the sense that it is 
produced largely for the domestic market. The 
domestic industry cannot meet the country’s 
demand and thus palm oil has always been im-
ported. The foreign investors who took over 
after privatization did not intend to export 
outside of the West African regional market, 
because the domestic and regional markets are 
large enough. Furthermore, there is no need 
to export when producers can get the same 
price domestically as they could on the export 
market, due to an agreement among palm oil 
producers and users in Ghana. Through their 
association, they agreed in the 1980s that users 
would only import palm oil (or a substitute 
oil) to meet their demand in excess of what 
domestic producers could supply. The price of 
domestic palm oil is set through a formula that 
was collectively agreed, and which adjusts the 
domestic price to be equal to the price of oil 
that is imported. This formula clearly benefits 
the producers, rather than the users, and was 
negotiated at a time when the producers were 
trying to get on their feet. Downstream pro-
ducers of goods that use palm oil, especially 
soap manufacturers, complain about the flood 
of cheap imports, and of the need to reassess 
the price setting formula.
Thus, the palm oil industry is not organ-
ized. It is dichotomized into two sub-sectors 
which are largely parallel but with smallholder 
producers straddling the two sub-sectors. This 
structure makes it difficult to expand and im-
prove the performance of the industrial sub-
sector, especially in the context of difficulty for 
estates in accessing large tracks of land. Indus-
try actors are not organized within, much less 
across, the two sub-sectors. The large estates 
are fragmented along corporate interests and 
have not taken a lead role in addressing coor-
dination and collective action problems within 
the industry.
In sum, the Oil Palm PSI achieved some-
thing, but much less than what was envisioned. 
Funds were wasted on nursery operators who 
abandoned operations when the government 
money stopped flowing and on farmers that 
could not keep up the size of farms they had 
planted. However, the initiative led to a mod-
est expansion in oil palm cultivated by 2009, 
an estimated 25,000 hectares. This figure seems 
more impressive given that at the start of the 
PSI in 2003 there were about 250,000 hec-
tares of oil palm cultivated, which increased to 
300,000 hectares by 2008, with at least half of 
the increase due to the PSI. It also expanded 
the use of higher-yielding oil palm seedlings 
among smallholder farmers. 
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3.4 horticulture export: a neglected 
opportunity
Ghana began exporting pineapples to Europe 
in small quantities in the mid1980s and ex-
ports grew slowly. At that time, the Ivory 
Coast almost monopolized the supply of fresh 
pineapples to the European market. Ghana 
carved out a niche in the European market 
as a primary supplier of top quality pineap-
ples shipped by air, and in the second half of 
the 1990s began shipping pineapples by sea. 
However, from 2005 Ghana’s pineapple export 
industry went into crisis, as it failed to remain 
internationally competitive. Total exports de-
creased and the industry was restructured. Just 
before the crisis, pineapple production for ex-
port was split between approximately 12 large 
farms (300-700 ha), about 40 medium farms 
(20-150 ha) and possibly as many as 10,000 
smallholders (0.2-10 ha). The crisis led to the 
exit of smallholders from export production 
and to the collapse of many medium and large 
producer-exporters. In 2009, total pineapple 
exports began to rebound, but production had 
become concentrated among a handful of very 
large farms.18 
Pineapple export has been the largest of 
Ghana’s horticulture exports, and to date, none 
of the other fresh whole horticulture products 
have really taken-off. Nor has the horticulture 
export sector received significant government 
support, which arguably could have helped to 
avert the crisis. The horticulture export sector 
has all the features that should make it mat-
ter to the ruling elite. It is a non-traditional 
export, grown in the rural areas, and predomi-
nantly controlled by Ghanaian entrepreneurs. 
Yet ruling elites across both ruling coalitions 
have shown little interest in the sector. Why 
1 For the detailed case study of pineapple exports, see 
Whitfield (2010b) and Whitfield (forthcoming 2012).
has it been so neglected? The short answer is 
that it could be neglected. There was no state 
presence in the sector, horticulture exports 
were not a large foreign exchange earner or a 
major export product, and horticulture pro-
ducers and exporters did not wield political 
influence as group of domestic capitalists or 
as members of the ruling coalition. There was 
little mutual interest between the horticulture 
entrepreneurs and the ruling elites. In fact, 
it seems that ruling elites across both parties 
are not interested in seeing domestic capital-
ists prosper who are not closely linked to their 
party, and thus where ruling elites can see the 
benefit to their political survival strategies.
There was a small initiative of the PNDC 
Minister for trade and industry, in collabora-
tion with the Ghana Export Promotion Coun-
cil, to support pineapple exports in the 1980s, 
but it was very significant for the industry 
which was in its infancy. However, it was the 
initiative of one individual and when he ‘fell 
out’ with Rawlings and left the ruling PNDC, 
there was not interest among other ruling elites 
in supporting the new horticulture producers 
and exporters. Initiatives to support horti-
culture exports in the 1990s and 2000s were 
donor-driven, particularly by the World Bank, 
and primarily targeted at smallholders and not 
at building the industry. Thus, the needs of the 
industry as a whole were not met, particularly 
in terms of the provision of public and indus-
try-specific goods necessary to make the indus-
try more competitive.
Regarding factor two, bureaucrats involved 
in the horticulture export sector have not been 
given political support. A small unit devoted 
to horticulture export within the Ministry of 
Agriculture has developed significant expertise 
and experience since the 1990s, but bureau-
crats in this unit have largely been ignored, 
have lacked political leverage in negotiations 
with donors, and have not shared a vision of 
the industry with horticulture producer-ex-
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porters. Regarding the latter, the bureaucrats 
have focused on smallholder production, with-
out considering the needs of the industry as 
a whole, although the crisis sparked a rethink 
and reorientation of many of these bureaucrats 
towards looking at the industry as a whole. 
On the other side, the industry associations 
are fragmented and weak. They have not been 
proactive in lobbying the government due to 
internal collective action problems. There is 
not much direct engagement between industry 
associations and the bureaucracy or between 
the associations and the ruling elite.
The horticulture export sector, and the pine-
apple export industry in particular, is not very 
organized, which has been one of the factors 
undermining its competitiveness (see Whitfield 
2010b). After the crisis in 2005, the numbers 
of producers shrank, so it is more organized 
now, but still plagued by significant collective 
action problems. Marketing is done by indi-
vidual companies, with significant negative ef-
fects on quality, price, cost of production and 
leverage in international markets, in contrast 
to the cocoa sector.
4. CONCluSIONS
The discussion of Mozambique’s and Ghana’s 
experiences emphasized not only the extent 
to which the four factors (seen as crucial to 
explaining economic outcomes) existed, but 
also how and why they came about in a coun-
try-specific context. In concluding, we focus 
on these ‘how and why’ questions, abstract-
ing from the country-specific context to make 
more general arguments about the political 
economy of development and thereby linking 
the paper to the argument by Whitfield and 
Therkildsen (2011) . We take each factor in 
turn and show how it links to features of the 
distribution of power in society and the char-
acteristics of the ruling coalition.
We know that sustained political support from 
the ruling elite for an industry is important, 
but the question is why do ruling elites sup-
port an industry? The answer is that ruling elit-
es must have a significant interest in doing so, 
which stems not from an economic rationale 
but a political one. Ruling elites are looking for 
ways to maintain their ruling coalitions and, 
in nominal democracies, to win elections. The 
kinds of strategies that they choose in fulfill-
ing these political imperatives stem from the 
characteristics of their present ruling coalition 
and the broader political and economic con-
text in which they function, as illustrated by 
the sugar case from Mozambique. Included 
in the characteristics of the ruling coalition is 
the financing to which the ruling elites have 
access in order to fund coalition maintenance 
and winning elections. There are two types of 
financing that ruling elites need. One type in-
cludes state revenues and foreign exchange, in 
order to fund their policies and strengthen the 
state. Cocoa export in Ghana is a case where 
the importance of the industry to financing 
the state was initially the compelling reason 
for supporting it. The second type of financing 
is the revenues that ruling elites can use to pay 
for the organization of the ruling coalition and 
to advance individual political ambitions, as il-
lustrated by the trade houses which controlled 
the internal sugar trade in Mozambique.
In short, there must be a mutual interest 
or mutual dependence between ruling elites 
and the relevant industry actors in order for 
the two sides to cooperate in building produc-
tive sectors. The mutual interest gives industry 
actors the ability to influence policy decisions 
and implementation. When there is no mutual 
interest, there is unlikely to be sustained politi-
cal support, as ruling elites’ initial interest can 
evaporate, as the case of horticulture export in 
Ghana illustrates.
Second, also important is the extent to which 
the bureaucratic agencies implementing policies 
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can be characterized as embedded and medi-
ating. These aspects are the essence of bureau-
cratic capacity and are required to create what 
have been referred to as ‘pockets of efficiency’. 
The competence of bureaucrats is not just about 
technical knowledge, but also involves relation-
ships with ruling elites (which hinge on loyal-
ty and trust) and with industry actors (which 
hinge on information flows, credible commit-
ment, and to a certain extent a shared vision). 
Again, the question is how do they come about? 
Their existence depends on relations between 
ruling elites and state bureaucrats on the one 
hand, and relations within the ruling coalition 
on the other hand. 
The sugar case illustrates this point well. Bu-
reaucrats in the Sugar Institute were not only 
competent, they were also loyal to the Frelimo 
ruling elites due to mutual interests between 
the ruling elites and bureaucrats. They shared 
the common economic desire to rehabilitate 
the industry and the common political objec-
tive of supporting Frelimo, because their posi-
tion and advancement were tied to Frelimo’s 
political success. Relations among the Frelimo 
ruling elites also played a critical role in making 
it possible for the Chissano-led faction to push 
through its policies in the face of resistance from 
some members of the ruling elite to foreign di-
rect investment and privatization as well as from 
ruling elites linked to the trade houses. The Fre-
limo ruling elite is characterized by greater cohe-
sion as a result of the civil war and the existential 
threats it posed. The loss of control of much of 
the country, the extent of economic devastation, 
and the near loss of the 1994 and 1999 elections 
pushed the Frelimo ruling elite to act more con-
certedly and gave Chissano some leverage over 
other factions within the ruling elite, at least 
with regard of the sugar sector.
Third, changing the ‘rules of the game’ can 
be essential for building productive sectors, but 
it requires the active will and ability of the rul-
ing elite to do so. Such changes in the existing 
distribution of benefits and allocation of state 
resources require that ruling elites be able to take 
decisions and enforce them despite the negative 
effects on the short-term interests of some groups 
in society. It is here that the characteristics of the 
ruling coalition matter. It matters whether the 
groups who stand to lose from shifting resources 
or existing benefits are within the ruling coali-
tion or outside of it, as well as how much power 
they have and the sources of their power. In par-
ticular, the key sources of financing for the rul-
ing coalition as well as the economic interests of 
ruling elites can affect the willingness and ability 
of ruling elites to change the rules of the game, 
as discussed for the cashew industry in Mozam-
bique. Finally, the real and perceived political 
costs and benefits of changing the rules depend 
on the ruling elites’ strategies for maintaining 
their coalitions and for winning elections, as in-
dicated in the case of sugar. 
Fourth and finally, strong organization with-
in a productive sector is important for overcom-
ing coordination and collective action problems 
which can undermine the economic perform-
ance of an industry. But there are two sets of 
processes going on, which (to make matters 
more complicated!) are interacting. On the one 
hand, the organization of an industry can affect 
the ability of industry actors to wield influence 
with the ruling elite. The independent char-
acteristics of the organization of the industry 
and the capabilities of individual entrepreneurs 
shape the perceptions of ruling elites of the im-
portance of the industry and of their interests in 
supporting it, as illustrated in the general neglect 
of horticulture export in Ghana. On the other 
hand, state actions can give reasons for industry 
actors to better organize themselves, and gov-
ernment policies can give industry actors a pole 
around which to organize and solve their coor-
dination or collective action problems, as shown 
in the case of sugar in Mozambique compared 
to palm oil in Ghana.
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